Why Golwalkar not Participated in Quit India Movement 1924?
Why Golwalkar not Participated in
Quit India Movement 1924?
There was no nation-wide organised force in the country that could successfully exploit such a golden opportunity. The Congress did announce the ‘Quit India’ movement under Gandhiji’s leadership, but it had neither clear-out plan or programme, nor was any effort made to bring together all the different forces that lay scattered all over the country. It is believed that Gandhiji had merely suggested to the Congress leaders to sit together on August 9, 1942 to think about the possibility of a movement. He had thought of a period of six months for its actual preparations. But the British Government proved too smart and did not let him have the time to carry out the plan. All the prominent leaders of the Congress were arrested as soon as they reached Mumbai. Incensed over this, the people took matters into their own hands and launched a movement without any preparation whatsoever. All the leaders were in jail and a leaderless movement got going on. A directionless agitation can erupt without a leader, but it cannot last long and is bound to peter out without achieving anything concrete. This movement too, met the same fate.
Golwalkar had surely enough considered whether or not to participate in such a movement and what its possible results, good and bad, would be. He took into consideration all aspects-the meager strength of the Sangh, the lack of planning by those conducting the movement, the lack of a clear direction, and the possibility of a national struggle not continuing for long for lack of a single command for the movement. No growing organisation can afford to be short-sighted and take some precipitate action in the heat of the moment and invite its own destruction. It was with this clear understanding that the Sangh, as an organisation, decided not to plunge into the movement.
This decision provoked criticism at the time and even ridicule in some quarters. But later events proved that Golwalkar, as the supreme guide of the organisation was right. In line with Doctorji’s policy he allowed Swayamsevaks to take part in the movement in their personal capacity. And indeed many Swayamsevaks did join the movement. The Sangh Swayamsevaks also efficiently carried out at many places the responsibility of looking after the underground workers. It was the Sangh Swayamsevaks who led the famous Chimur revolt and were awarded death sentences. The many underground workers whose safety was ensured by Sangh workers included prominent leaders like Krantiveer Nana Patil, Kisan Veer Sane Guruji, Aruna Asaf Ali, Achyut Patwardhan and Kundanlal Gupta. These leaders were by no means adherents of the Sangh’s ideology. Actually even after 1942 they remained as opponents of the Sangh. But the Swayamsevaks did not look into their ideological differences while ensuring their safety.
The most important thing for the Sangh was to set up a wide network of Shakhas and increase its organisational power. It was a time when the leadership of an organisation oriented towards a great, nation building goal like the Sangh had to assess from time to time the situation carefully and take responsible decisions. It would therefore be an insult to one’s intelligence to question its patriotism, courage and spirit of sacrifice. Those thousands of young men who worked for the Sangh day and night were indeed shining examples of pristine patriotism and dedication. The leaders of the Sangh had to assess a situation prevailing at a certain point of time before deciding about participation in a particular movement. After all, awakening and building up the disciplined might of the people was intended for enhancing the nation’s glory.
In order to explain what was Golwalkar’s thinking vis a vis the 1942 movement, it would be in the fitness of things to reproduce here some memories of the well- known labour leader Dattopant Thengadi: “At the end of September 1942, Golwalkar was to conclude the programme at Mangalore and proceed to Madras. The 1942 movement had created a turmoil in the minds of many Swayamsevaks and even pracharaks. The question troubling them was – if the Sangh was to do nothing even at such a crucial juncture what was the use of all its strength built up so far? In those days, I was a pracharak in Calicut. As Calicut was near to Mangalore I was asked to go to Mangalore, meet Guruji and acquaint him with what they all felt. So I went and met Guruji to narrating what happened in that meeting. Shri Thengadi says: “I placed their views before Golwalkar; the gist what he said in reply is as follows: Right from the beginning, the Sangh has decided to observe certain constraints in some matters. So, when Doctorji decided to participate in the satyagraha, he directed the Swayamsevaks to keep out of it and conduct the Shakha work with regularity. He had kept the Sangh as such out of the agitation.”
Still as such constraints can be kept aside at a critical time like this if by doing so it would help the attainment of freedom, because the work of the Sangh as also all such constraints are meant for achieving an ideal, and freedom is our immediate goal. It would have been good if the Congress had taken the Sangh and other such organizations into confidence before launching the movement. But it is not necessary to be put out merely because it did not do so. The freedom for which the movement is meant to achieve is freedom for all, not just for the Congressmen. So there is no place for institutional ego in such matters.
However, the fact that the Congress leaders did not make what they considered adequate preparations before giving the necessary directive for the agitation is a matter of grave concern. As a result, the people had to confront the British Government quite unprepared. There was no well-thought-out-plan. Not that in times of revolution everything will happen as per the plan. Still, some plan is necessary, and if it needs to be changed the initiative should be with the leaders. Such is not the position today. So, the situation is not under the control of the leadership, nor is it in a position to guide and channelise the people’s upsurge of feelings and actions. For any revolutionary movement to be so very bereft of planning is highly suicidal.
Despite all this, there should be no objection to the Sangh jumping into this agitation if only that would have helped in the attainment of the goal. But on careful thought, I have realised that we cannot reach our goal even if we took part in it with all our might. Some people have an exaggerated notion of the Sangh’s present strength. In particular, people in areas where the Sangh is strong imagine that it is equally strong in other parts of the country as well. But the fact is, it is not so. Along with your own adequate strength, some other favourable factors are also needed for the success of an agitation, - as for instance, active sympathy of the general public, resentment against the government in important departments like the army, the police etc. It is difficult to say how deeply concerned the people are, and how they would react when the time to act comes.
But even if we assume that all such factors would be favourable for a revolution, I feel an agitation that we may conduct with all our might can succeed only in a limited area – say, from Belgaum to Gondia. So it is obvious that this would not take us to our goal. For, our area of influence is limited only to the middle of the country. In the event of a successful revolution the freed area would be attacked by enemy forces from all sides, and if the government forces entered the area their atrocities on the people would leave the people in deep despair. The result would be just the opposite of what was envisaged. In such a situation, I think the Sangh’s participation in the movement would serve no purpose. I am not thinking of our safety as an organisation, but from the point of view of a strategy an agitation at this time, would lead to nothing but further frustration in the minds of the people.
The 1942 movement set off a big national upheaval and came to a standstill after a time. However it made the British rulers realise the intensity of the Indian aspiration for freedom. But its petering out, with the leaders behind the bars and no planned programme placed before the people naturally resulted in despair among them. At the same time, the war situation had changed in favour of the so-called Allies. It became virtually impossible for Subhash Bose and his army to enter India and march to Delhi. Under such circumstances, the Sangh alone came forward to make Herculean efforts, under Golwalkar’s leadership to infuse fresh hope, confidence and enthusiasm among the people. The people too responded enthusiastically. As a result, during the post-1942 period, the Sangh Shakhas spread out rapidly from province to province. Workers were mobilised to move from place to place. Swayamsevaks could be seen flooding in Shakhas all over. With the exception of Bengal, Assam, Orissa and Tamil Nadu the Sangh made significant progress all over the country. In northern parts of India, especially, it became a substantial force. At the same time, however, there were signs that the national goal of independence of Akhand Bharat was being fractured.
Right from 1940 onwards, the Muslim League had started advocating the two-nation theory and demanding a separate state for Muslims on its basis. Jinnah had taken the stand that the Congress was a party of Hindus and had no right to speak on behalf of crores of Muslims of the country. The Congress did announce the ‘Quit India’ movement under Gandhiji’s leadership, but it had neither clear-out plan or programme, nor was any effort made to bring together all the different forces that lay scattered all over the country. It is believed that Gandhiji had merely suggested to the Congress leaders to sit together on August 9, 1942 to think about the possibility of a movement. He had thought of a period of six months for its actual preparations. But the British Government proved too smart and did not let him have the time to carry out the plan. All the prominent leaders of the Congress were arrested as soon as they reached Mumbai. Incensed over this, the people took matters into their own hands and launched a movement without any preparation whatsoever. All the leaders were in jail and a leaderless movement got going on. A directionless agitation can erupt without a leader, but it cannot last long and is bound to peter out without achieving anything concrete. This movement too, met the same fate.
Golwalkar had surely enough considered whether or not to participate in such a movement and what its possible results, good and bad, would be. He took into consideration all aspects-the meager strength of the Sangh, the lack of planning by those conducting the movement, the lack of a clear direction, and the possibility of a national struggle not continuing for long for lack of a single command for the movement. No growing organisation can afford to be short-sighted and take some precipitate action in the heat of the moment and invite its own destruction. It was with this clear understanding that the Sangh, as an organisation, decided not to plunge into the movement.
This decision provoked criticism at the time and even ridicule in some quarters. But later events proved that Golwalkar, as the supreme guide of the organisation was right. In line with Doctorji’s policy he allowed Swayamsevaks to take part in the movement in their personal capacity. And indeed many Swayamsevaks did join the movement. The Sangh Swayamsevaks also efficiently carried out at many places the responsibility of looking after the underground workers. It was the Sangh Swayamsevaks who led the famous Chimur revolt and were awarded death sentences. The many underground workers whose safety was ensured by Sangh workers included prominent leaders like Krantiveer Nana Patil, Kisan Veer Sane Guruji, Aruna Asaf Ali, Achyut Patwardhan and Kundanlal Gupta. These leaders were by no means adherents of the Sangh’s ideology. Actually even after 1942 they remained as opponents of the Sangh. But the Swayamsevaks did not look into their ideological differences while ensuring their safety.
The most important thing for the Sangh was to set up a wide network of Shakhas and increase its organisational power. It was a time when the leadership of an organisation oriented towards a great, nation building goal like the Sangh had to assess from time to time the situation carefully and take responsible decisions. It would therefore be an insult to one’s intelligence to question its patriotism, courage and spirit of sacrifice. Those thousands of young men who worked for the Sangh day and night were indeed shining examples of pristine patriotism and dedication. The leaders of the Sangh had to assess a situation prevailing at a certain point of time before deciding about participation in a particular movement. After all, awakening and building up the disciplined might of the people was intended for enhancing the nation’s glory.
In order to explain what was Golwalkar’s thinking vis a vis the 1942 movement, it would be in the fitness of things to reproduce here some memories of the well- known labour leader Dattopant Thengadi: “At the end of September 1942, Golwalkar was to conclude the programme at Mangalore and proceed to Madras. The 1942 movement had created a turmoil in the minds of many Swayamsevaks and even pracharaks. The question troubling them was – if the Sangh was to do nothing even at such a crucial juncture what was the use of all its strength built up so far? In those days, I was a pracharak in Calicut. As Calicut was near to Mangalore I was asked to go to Mangalore, meet Guruji and acquaint him with what they all felt. So I went and met Guruji to narrating what happened in that meeting. Shri Thengadi says: “I placed their views before Golwalkar; the gist what he said in reply is as follows: Right from the beginning, the Sangh has decided to observe certain constraints in some matters. So, when Doctorji decided to participate in the satyagraha, he directed the Swayamsevaks to keep out of it and conduct the Shakha work with regularity. He had kept the Sangh as such out of the agitation.”
Still as such constraints can be kept aside at a critical time like this if by doing so it would help the attainment of freedom, because the work of the Sangh as also all such constraints are meant for achieving an ideal, and freedom is our immediate goal. It would have been good if the Congress had taken the Sangh and other such organizations into confidence before launching the movement. But it is not necessary to be put out merely because it did not do so. The freedom for which the movement is meant to achieve is freedom for all, not just for the Congressmen. So there is no place for institutional ego in such matters.
However, the fact that the Congress leaders did not make what they considered adequate preparations before giving the necessary directive for the agitation is a matter of grave concern. As a result, the people had to confront the British Government quite unprepared. There was no well-thought-out-plan. Not that in times of revolution everything will happen as per the plan. Still, some plan is necessary, and if it needs to be changed the initiative should be with the leaders. Such is not the position today. So, the situation is not under the control of the leadership, nor is it in a position to guide and channelise the people’s upsurge of feelings and actions. For any revolutionary movement to be so very bereft of planning is highly suicidal.
Despite all this, there should be no objection to the Sangh jumping into this agitation if only that would have helped in the attainment of the goal. But on careful thought, I have realised that we cannot reach our goal even if we took part in it with all our might. Some people have an exaggerated notion of the Sangh’s present strength. In particular, people in areas where the Sangh is strong imagine that it is equally strong in other parts of the country as well. But the fact is, it is not so. Along with your own adequate strength, some other favourable factors are also needed for the success of an agitation, - as for instance, active sympathy of the general public, resentment against the government in important departments like the army, the police etc. It is difficult to say how deeply concerned the people are, and how they would react when the time to act comes.
But even if we assume that all such factors would be favourable for a revolution, I feel an agitation that we may conduct with all our might can succeed only in a limited area – say, from Belgaum to Gondia. So it is obvious that this would not take us to our goal. For, our area of influence is limited only to the middle of the country. In the event of a successful revolution the freed area would be attacked by enemy forces from all sides, and if the government forces entered the area their atrocities on the people would leave the people in deep despair. The result would be just the opposite of what was envisaged. In such a situation, I think the Sangh’s participation in the movement would serve no purpose. I am not thinking of our safety as an organisation, but from the point of view of a strategy an agitation at this time, would lead to nothing but further frustration in the minds of the people.
The 1942 movement set off a big national upheaval and came to a standstill after a time. However it made the British rulers realise the intensity of the Indian aspiration for freedom. But its petering out, with the leaders behind the bars and no planned programme placed before the people naturally resulted in despair among them. At the same time, the war situation had changed in favour of the so-called Allies. It became virtually impossible for Subhash Bose and his army to enter India and march to Delhi. Under such circumstances, the Sangh alone came forward to make Herculean efforts, under Golwalkar’s leadership to infuse fresh hope, confidence and enthusiasm among the people.
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